from O.R.C.A.
Anarcho-Feminist Tech group meeting up at O.R.C.A. Monday 11/18 7-10pm
Data Care is a coworking group that comes together to independently work on deleting files, tightening digital security, troubleshooting & researching. Bring your own project, spitball with other nerds.
A few of us will be working on deleting extraneous internet accounts & burning gmail.
We’ll be using hot spots.
from North Shore
Read the full text, including visuals, online as a PDF.
Find the full text ready for printing as an imposed PDF.
Since the commencement of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, millions around the world have taken to the streets in support of Palestine against the genocidal Zionist entity. We are, globally, in an unprecedented moment of anti-imperialist mobilisation, which threatens not only the Zionist occupation but the colonial powers that uphold it.
This text was written through the summer and early autumn of 2024 from Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee territory (so-called Southern Ontario, Canada), where people, many new to the left, have been facing intensified violence and harassment from both police and Zionists. Protests are regularly met with arrests and other attacks, which have created a climate of fear among attendees and organisers.
At the same time, that fear, combined with a disconnect from previous generations of struggle and an often-unchallenged fear of militancy, has led to practices that end up putting our comrades in more danger. This text hopes to address one such recurring issue.
what is bad-jacketing?
“Bad-jacketing” (or “cop-jacketing,” “fed-jacketing,” or “snitch-jacketing”) is the practice of accusing people of being a cop, informant, fascist, or other kind of bad actor on specious or non-existent evidence.
The term has been used since at least the 1960s, where it primarily described COINTELPRO operations that bad-jacketed legitimate members of the Black Panther Party and other organisations. It was, ironically, rumours from infiltrators consolidating their own positions that led to organisations not only isolating but, in some cases, severely beating or executing innocent individuals.
why is bad-jacketing a problem?
A 2015 text titled “No badjacketing: the state wants to kill us; let’s not cooperate” by the Twin Cities GDC, Local 14, says:
- At the least, it pushes away people who have, or are willing, to do work and make sacrifices for the movements.
- Worse, it silences entire groups by sowing mistrust within them and making discussion of strategy and tactics difficult.
- Very commonly, those accused of acting as informants become so alienated from their accusers that they actually become snitches.
- Worst-case scenario, people die. That worst-case scenario is all too common and real, and there is a famous regional history to it as well, in the case of Anna Mae Aquash, a Native American woman from Canada who had worked and sacrificed tireless for the American Indian Movement, or AIM.
Southern Ontario in 2024 is, of course, not the US in the 1960s and 1970s. Our contemporary movements do not act on false accusations of snitching by killing the accused. And while we know that the police are trying to infiltrate us and turn people into informants, the vast majority of these accusations are definitely not coming from people on the state’s payroll.
The biggest threat that bad-jacketing poses to us, here and now, is that it singles people out for state repression. Militants are more likely to be on the receiving end of these accusations, but also, anecdotally, people of colour, neurodivergent people, and anyone who “does not belong” (and, of course, people who fall into all of those categories). In doing so, the people who make these accusations in effect carry out the work of the state. They reproduce the oppressive dynamics of the outside world and push people out – often, the very people our movements are supposed to be fighting for. By pushing them out, bad-jacketing then denies support to people who are often already at heightened risk of criminalisation. It makes people into easy targets, signaling to the police that they can get away with brutalising, arresting, and jailing someone without outcry from the community.
During the 2020 Black liberation uprisings in the US, posts flooded our feeds, warning of “agents provocateur.” Decontextualised videos of police unloading bricks spread like wildfire among both far-right and far-left social media networks. Fascist fear-mongering about out-of-town “ANTIFA” inciting riots trickled down into leftist hyper-vigilance against “white outside agitators.” These warnings often ventured into the realm of conspiracy theories, where protests with unknown organisers or cop cars on fire were signs of a police set-up.
All this has had devastating consequences. The normalisation of this paranoid urge to see false flags around every corner has empowered people “on the left” to share images and openly work to identify individuals carrying out illegal actions. Contrary to what they may believe, these people’s efforts to “root out infiltrators” have in many cases now become the actual basis for the state to arrest and jail its opponents.
Beyond that, bad-jacketing leads to feelings of insecurity and distrust that can tear apart a movement – even without any real infiltrators being involved. Both online and on the ground, we can hear breathless accusations that someone at a protest is an undercover Zionist operative, often for no reason beyond that “they make us look bad.” Zionists, constantly on the lookout for ammunition against us, gladly stoke the flames. Projects like the “Shirion Collective,” a Zionist doxing campaign that claimed on social media to be training undercover operatives, see and celebrate when the left eats its own. We must be equally vigilant against these psychological attacks, which are more subtle and yet can do more damage than any one undercover’s testimony.
“professionally trained to make us look bad”
– Kristina Beverlin on Isaiah Willoughby
On October 5, 2021, Isaiah Willoughby, a Black man, was sentenced to two years in prison for lighting a fire outside an abandoned police precinct in Seattle in June 2020. Willoughby acted because of the murders of Manuel Ellis, his former roommate, and George Floyd at the hands of the police.
When it happened, Kristina Beverlin, a white woman who now wears a kufiya and a “Free Palestine” hat in her profile picture, immediately blasted out a photo of Willoughby. She tweeted that he “just tried to start a fire at the abandoned precinct” and called on “everyone in Seattle to retweet the photo of this man.”
In subsequent tweets, she stated her belief that “SPD wanted the precinct to catch fire to make the peaceful protesters look bad, after SPD had looked like monsters for days.”
It was her initial tweet that appeared in a court affidavit against Willoughby, and her photo that the police disseminated to identify him. In other words, it was this white woman’s insistence that the police wanted someone to set fire to the precinct, and that anyone who did so could only have been directed by the police, that sent a Black man to prison. Like any other white vigilante, the self-deputised liberal peace police will discipline, with violence if necessary, Black or people of colour who step out of line. Unlike any other, she does it in the name of anti-racism, with an #ACAB hashtag in the same breath.
Similarly, social media users widely disseminated photos of a white woman suspected to have carried out the arson of the Atlanta Wendy’s where police murdered Rayshard Brooks. That she was white was proof to them that bad actors with no connection to the movement were behind property destruction during the uprisings, and that without those bad actors, the protests would have been peaceful. As it turned out, the woman in question was Natalie White, who Brooks had called his girlfriend on the night of his death. Two Black men, Chisom Kingston and John Wesley Wade, were later charged for the Wendy’s arson as well. As of December 2023, White and Kingston had accepted plea deals for probation, a fine, and community service, while Wade was scheduled to go to trial.
In both these examples, the people who sought to identify state agents “instigating” at protests were ultimately the people who acted as cops. The gravity of these actions cannot be overstated – they, and we, already know that police kill and torture Black people on the streets, and prison guards do the same against their captives on the inside.
Following the May 2022 leak of the US Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, Jane’s Revenge shared a communiqué about the fire-bombing of a predatory anti-choice “pregnancy centre” in Madison. The action sparked the usual uproar among the right about “woke ANTIFA terrorists” waging war against Christianity. But rather than defend the action’s righteousness, much of the left instead occupied itself with speculation about whether cursive graffiti and a “too-neat” circle-A meant that it was a false flag. The underlying logic here was that if something looked “too perfect,” if it made the right too angry, it couldn’t possibly be real. We may talk of rioting against the Supreme Court, but no one seriously means it.
In response to the right-wing outrage campaign about Jane’s Revenge, the FBI offered a bounty of up to $25,000 for information. Days later, in January 2023, the US Department of Justice indicted two people for graffiti on anti-abortion centres in Florida, actions that were also broadcast through Jane’s Revenge. The Florida investigation eventually produced in a total of four arrests, all but one of the defendants being women of colour. Worse, the Florida 4 were prosecuted under the FACE Act, a law intended to protect abortion access. Meanwhile, an investigation that involved 11 different state agencies and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force culminated in the March 2023 arrest of Hridindu Sankar Roychowdhury for the Madison fire-bombing. Though the right jumped at the opportunity to gloat, widely publicising the defendants’ photos and personal information, charges against Roychowdhury and the Florida 4 received little attention from the left. Roychowdhury pled guilty after being denied pre-trial release and was sentenced to 90 months (7.5 years) in federal prison on April 10, 2024. Three of the Florida 4, after taking felony pleas that avoided convictions under the FACE Act, were also handed down prison time on September 12 of this year, ranging from 30 days to 1 year and 1 day. Popular support may not have prevented those prosecutions, but the significance of solidarity shouldn’t be understated. Instead, much of the left’s message to militants turns out to have been: “we’ll call you feds, and when it turns out we were wrong, we’ll abandon you anyways.”
Though we never had our own Third Precinct moment, left networks in Ontario fell victim to many of the same conspiratorial impulses. Reposted Instagram stories warned of “suspicious piles of bricks” left as bait near march routes and even “black blocs from Montréal” coming into town to start riots.
While, regrettably, no such riot materialised here in 2020, the bad-jacketing of the black bloc has a long history in Southern Ontario, as in other regions. A particularly egregious example came in the wake of the Toronto G20 in 2010, where liberals convinced themselves that the property damage was all an inside job and set out looking for proof. They singled out a muscular white man in combat boots and “cop-like” black pants for looking suspicious, digging up every image of him they could find. All of this crowd-sourced evidence built a convenient case for the police, who arrested and jailed the target of their suspicions.
A pattern emerges: subsequent repression draws only a fraction of the concern that the broad left had earlier put into interrogating the legitimacy of an action. This is one of the most insidious functions of badjacketing and disavowal – it aids the state project of disappearing people. Speculation about false flags, made exponentially worse by social media and algorithms that egg on endless engagement, steals away energy that could be spent preparing for the repression to come. It turns actions into abstractions ripe for every person to project their own arguments. That abstraction removes militants’ humanity from the picture, enjoining us to forget that real people, putting their lives on the line for the movement, must have lit the match or thrown the brick. The collective failure to adequately show up for each defendant and prisoner in this section – and many more not named – goes beyond a culture of disposability. It is a mass forgetting that makes each of us who partakes in it complicit in the work of the police, prisons, and the carceral state to not only extinguish our resistance but also erase our memory of its very possibility – and our memory and connection to the people who’ve sacrificed to keep that possibility alive.
when people are occupied, resistance is justified
The movement for Palestine has long been one of the most hyper-surveiled and attacked. Only when it comes to the Palestinian struggle will even the most mild, pacifist expressions of support land someone on McCarthyist blacklists like Canary Mission, extensive repositories of personal information stretching back years. It is no wonder, then, that people are – correctly – concerned about being targeted by our enemies, which include not just the settler colonial state itself but also Zionists who self-organise outside of it.
Unfortunately, this has once again meant a dangerous resurgence of bad-jacketing. In February 2024, social media posts from the “Shirion Collective” sparked mass outrage and panic among supporters of Palestine. Announcing an “Operation Global Insight,” the posts claimed to be launching an “undercover operation” in key locations such as Toronto. “Volunteers willing to wear keffiyehs and walk [masked] in these demonstrations” would “be provided an hour long basic training by one of [their] ex-Mossad team leads.” Further, “individuals with Arabic-sounding names and Middle Eastern appearance may be uniquely positioned for deeper infiltration and will receive cash compensation for their vital role in [the] operation.”
Though the collective is, without a question, real, there is plenty of reason to believe that the reaction to the post was disproportionate to their actual abilities. Sensationalist claims of Mossad ties in an emoji-studded public tweet do not paint a picture of a sophisticated intelligence operation. Neither do their existing “exposés” on social media, which, despite techno-babble buzzwords about AI, are largely limited to reposting other people’s footage and open-source information that anyone with access to Google could easily retrieve. The description of walking around at protests and “law enforcement presence” suggests no actual knowledge of how Palestine solidarity groups organise or bring in new members. A few people with bad intentions joining a march of hundreds or thousands, where every angle is already recorded and streamed live on Instagram, can hardly be characterised as “infiltration.”
If that were not enough on its own, the White Rose Society, an anti-fascist research group, shared internal screenshots from Shirion’s Telegram channel that confirmed the post’s real purpose was to sow fear and distrust. One Shirion volunteer is quoted as saying:
We won’t need to do anything. They will:
- Tone down
- Police their own
- Maybe even beat up their own just because they think those are us
That summary of their goals succinctly re-states the risks that bad-jacketing poses to our movements.
Even before the Shirion scare, claims that someone was secretly a Zionist or cop were already commonplace. People who wear the symbols or fly the flags of the Palestinian resistance have been accused of being “agitators,” sent by Zionist organisations like B’nai Brith to make protestors look bad. Over-the-shoulder glimpses of someone’s phone or poor fashion choices have been presented as evidence that a protestor is actually an undercover. Online, Palestinians have been accused of being Zionist sockpuppets off of little more than bad feelings. And, naturally, even minor disagreements or political critiques will end in allegations that so-and-so is a fed. While, thankfully, conspiratorial crowds here have not at least yet handed over one of our own to the cops, these accusations are sometimes accompanied by calls to act against someone. In one case recently, a queer person of colour known to other attendees was followed, harassed, and filmed aggressively at a protest because someone had decided for no clear reason that they were a Zionist in disguise.
As the police continue to crack down on us, it is all the more crucial that we learn from the mistakes of the recent past. We cannot let our rightful vigilance lead us to attack our own comrades. Nor should we water down our political lines, our demands, or our tactics for fear that the media and the right will smear us – they do that regardless. It may not be possible to eliminate some, faint chance that an infiltrator is behind a resistance flag, a punch thrown at a Zionist, a brick through a window, but far more likely is that some brave person, who has chosen to more boldly and unabashedly confront this genocidal system and its supporters, is responsible. For that, they deserve our support and our solidarity against whatever repression may come, not our condemnation.
knowing our enemies
An over-emphasis on undercovers may lead to an under-emphasis on other security vulnerabilities. Rather than acting according to a one-size-fits-all checklist or, worse, reacting to threats only as they appear, it’s important to proactively identify and individually study threats in order to understand how to address them. That is to say, what – specifically – is your enemy trying to do? How do they do it? The process of answering these questions is known as threat modeling.
Accounts like Shirion, Leviathan, or StopAntisemitism are real threats, as any of their victims know all too well. But OSINT, as well as everyday acquaintances, are much likelier to be the source of their information.
Your personal Instagram or TikTok page might already give away your identity, the protests you attend, your work or school, and the identities of your friends and family members. Your employer might publicly share profiles, including photos, of all of their staff on their website. Tools like PimEyes and FaceCheck.ID allow anyone willing to pay for them to run facial recognition technology and search the Internet for a given face.
If you’re a student, a Zionist classmate could easily recognise you from criticising racism in class and look up your personal information in a school database. A right-wing former colleague could remember you for being politically outspoken at your shared workplace. Knowing the true identities of everyone at a march will do nothing to prevent doxing if, for example, that march is being streamed online, your face is exposed, and your social media is public.
what about the real infiltrators and provocateurs?
Infiltration – actual infiltration, where someone comes into our organisations and our lives, pretending to be our friend, only to hand information over to the state – should not be taken lightly. But our baseline understanding of it often takes the form of a few convenient tropes, reinforcing existing biases against militancy and justifying dismissiveness towards criticism. These tropes prevent us from truly knowing our enemies.
The late Matt Cicero wrote that:
[there is a] misconception that all infiltrators act as agents provocateurs who try to manipulate activists into taking illegal, violent, unpopular, and ineffective actions. But as Gary T. Marx points out in his theory of social movement infiltration, social movements are damaged by “opposing organizational, tactical, and resource mobilization tasks.” In other words, infiltrators suppress social movements by fomenting divisions and internal conflicts, diverting energies toward defending the movement rather than pursuing broader social goals, sowing misinformation or damaging reputations, obstructing the supply of resources (money, transport, meeting spaces), or sabotaging planned actions. Many infiltrators are thus better described as agents suppressants, who are there to gather intelligence and channel groups away from militant action.
[…]Incidents of provocation can be high-profile and sensational, such as undercover police posing as members of the black bloc at Montebello. This can lead activists to paint all militant action as the work of agents provocateurs, even if there is no evidence that this is true. Conversely, because of the low-profile of most agents suppressants, activists are often unaware of their role and impact in pacifying and controlling social movements.
The spectre of the provocateur itself, then, carries out the suppressant role of “put[ting] a damper on evolving movement militancy.”
The single-minded focus on the agent provocateur often goes hand-in-hand with a short-term view of state repression as having only two main goals:
But as Cicero describes, the state is additionally engaged in a long-term project of suppression and counter-insurgency. The police cannot arrest every dissident – but they don’t need to jail us all to successfully maintain the colonial order. The central goal of counter-insurgency is to preserve legitimacy and control.
To that end, some further goals of state repression include, but are not limited to:
We should examine the issue of infiltration with all of these goals in mind. David Gilbert says, “[t]here is no simple litmus test to differentiate sincere militancy from provocation or honest caution from suppression.” The same extends to the search for infiltrators more broadly. Most of the time, the only truly conclusive proof that someone is a police infiltrator comes from seeing the evidence against you that they’ve handed over to the state after you’ve been charged. That isn’t of much help – by the time you have those court documents in your possession, the damage will already have been done. That is assuming that the information they collect ever goes to court at all. RCMP documents from the G20 suggest that there may have been as many as 12 undercover officers. Far fewer than that were ever exposed by name, and the remainders’ identities may never be known.
People who’ve experienced the profound betrayal of finding out that someone they knew was an undercover or informant often end up drawing conclusions that are diametrically opposed from one another. But a common thread persists through most of their takeaways: there are few ways to prove for certain that someone is a cop, and many ways that the hunt for infiltrators itself instead undermines our work and furthers the state’s goals.
Accordingly, we should turn our energies to proactively building a security culture that protects us from both infiltration and other security threats. Much has been written on this subject already. In short: solid security practices should mean that an undercover cop is prevented from gathering meaningful information even if we do not know who they are, and that security risks are dealt with regardless of whether an individual is specifically acting on behalf of the state. If you do everything right, a plainclothes still won’t know who among the bloc smashed that ATM, even if they saw it happen with their own eyes.
As the ever-green “Why Misogynists Make Great Informants” reminds us, many of the greatest threats to our movements may not officially collaborate with the police either. In the Toronto anti-fascist scene alone, multiple people accused of misogyny and sexual violence/gender-based violence later went on to renounce the left, consort with their former opponents, and attack (verbally, physically, and with legal threats) their former comrades. None of those people, to our knowledge, were undercover cops, nor were they secretly fascists all along. Looking for a non-existent smoking gun to show that someone was lying about their identity would – and did – only delay people from taking necessary action against them when the myriad of other red flags should have been more than enough.
naming our enemies
The epidemic of bad-jacketing is inseparable from the problem of peace policing. Many organisers advocate for a policy of de-escalation at all costs, even in the face of potentially deadly violence from police and Zionists. They speak of “agitators” who disrupt and “escalate” “peaceful protests” – a nebulous euphemism that they apply to both the Zionist who shows up with a knife and the militant who comes prepared to fight back.
We should be clear: our enemies are not “agitators.”
Our enemies are the police, who brutalise us and lock us away to enforce settler colonial order. Our enemies are Zionists and other white supremacists, who assault and harass us in the streets, and stalk and threaten us in our everyday lives. Our enemies are politicians and other establishment liberals, who carry out colonial and imperialist genocides, here, in Palestine, and around the world, all the while crying crocodile tears about a so-called humanitarian crisis that they created. Our enemies are legacy media institutions, who smear resistance as terrorism and mobilise support for each of these attacks.
We must take care to differentiate between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, and to distinguish between enemies and potential friends. Too often, we see organisers reject co-strugglers in order to appeal to liberal institutions that will never be on our side. They may frame the conservative path as the only strategic option, rejecting open support for armed struggle, militant direct action, and anything else that would create “bad optics.” Disagreements from co-strugglers are treated as threats worse than that of liberal media, who we must appeal to for sympathy, or Zionists and cops, who we must appease for our safety.
When our enemies attack us anyways, these organisers pin the blame not on the perpetrators but on the co-strugglers who deviate from their line. They forget that to be attacked by the enemy is not a bad thing but a good thing. Our enemies do not strive for unity with us, knowing that ours is an antagonistic contradiction, knowing that our collective liberation requires their annihilation. It is better that we, too, abandon any notions of conciliation and recognise our enemies as enemies.
For all these reasons, we urge people to draw a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. Abandon the euphemisms and name our enemies. When we struggle through our differences, let us do so with a shared understanding of what we are for and what we are against.
by every means necessary
Not only is bad-jacketing dangerous, it is disempowering and demobilising. It forecloses entire realms of possibility, insisting that we limit ourselves to the same set of legal, non-violent tactics. It threatens state violence against people who do not comply with those limitations being imposed upon their actions. Many people cannot take the risk of arrest. But something being risky does not make it impossible. Just because some of us cannot act does not mean that no one should.
While its meaning is sometimes lost, respecting a “diversity of tactics” means refusing to impose non-violence upon our co-strugglers and declining to condemn those that destroy property or take up arms. As a group of autonomous UCLA students writes in the wake of vicious assaults on their encampment:
We have noticed a trend of the desire to appear peaceful for the media taking precedent over the right of protestors to self defense, mirroring the world’s response to Palestinians’ right to self defense in the face of blatant fascist attacks and eliminationist violence.
We cannot allow our resistance movement to demand obedience over safety in the same way as western imperialist forces against the colonized.
Without drawing false equivalence with a people living under active bombardment and military invasion, the liberal urge that leads people to denounce burning precincts or fake clinics as “giving police an excuse to crack down” is the same that denounces the Palestinian resistance for “giving Israel an excuse to destroy Gaza.” We must refuse any invitation to distance ourselves as the “good,” “peaceful,” “innocent” ones. Instead, we affirm the right of Palestinians and all people to resist colonial domination by any means necessary.
We would remind our co-strugglers, too, that our enemies do not care about the truth, and they have no conscience. We see this in the viciousness with which the police enforce an unprecedented ban on overpass protests in Toronto, where people rallied on the sidewalk to wave flags and chant. We see it in the eagerness with which a long list of electeds, including the Prime Minister himself, leapt to denounce a protest of a Jewish hospital that never happened. We see it in the adamance with which Zionists call the very existence of Palestinians a terrorist threat against them, no matter how young, no matter how innocent, no matter how non-violent. Right-wing propagandists will fabricate scandals out of thin air, and the establishment will happily take up their version of the story. Even if each and every one of us swears to turn the other cheek to our assailants, as long as we challenge the colonial status quo, in our enemies’ eyes, we will never be peaceful.
Another path is possible, and the movement to Stop Cop City sets a powerful example. In February, a journalist asked spokesperson Mary Hooks of Vote to Stop Cop City whether organisers condemned arsons of police vehicles. She answered:
Hell no. No. Not at all, And to be honest with you, Atlanta deserves more than that. Real talk, they’re lucky, this city is lucky, this country is lucky. Atlanta has its hands in literally murdering Palestinians right now. You think we give a damn about some equipment? Not at all. Not at all.
But some of us, we cannot take that risk. And those who can, bless them. Bless them. I cannot take that risk. But Lord knows, I’ll sit with my lighter and be like, damn.
[…]We need every, every means necessary to deal in the police state we are dealing with. So I don’t care, no, and I would imagine my comrades would say the same. No, not gonna condemn nobody for doing righteously what they need to do when our city has silenced every quote-unquote proper, democratic process.
The movement’s aboveground and clandestine elements are two parts of a whole. Both are necessary for our victory.
Listen to Isaiah Willoughby speak in his own words on Kite Line Radio:
Support defendants and prisoners from the George Floyd Uprisings:
Contribute to the Florida 4’s commissary and find other ways to support through the Anti-Repression Committee of South Florida:
more on peace policing
“ACAB Includes Peace Police: Three Report Backs from Palestinian Solidarity Actions” (November 2023) on Archive.org, online at archive.org/details/acab-includes-peace-police-en-print-8/page/2/mode/2up
“Peace Police are Police: How Protest Marshals Sabotage Liberation and Protect the State” (December 2023) on North Shore Counter-Info, online at north-shore.info/2024/03/11/peace-police-are-police-new-zine-classic-image/
more on security
“Confidence. Courage. Connect. Trust. A proposal for security culture” (November 5, 2019) on North Shore Counter-Info, online at north-shore.info/2019/11/05/confidence-courage-connection-trust-a-proposal-for-security-culture/
“Doxcare: Prevention and Aftercare for Those Targeted by Doxxing and Political Harassment” (August 26, 2020) on CrimethInc., online at crimethinc.com/2020/08/26/doxcare-prevention-and-aftercare-for-those-targeted-by-doxxing-and-political-harassment
The Threat Library by the No Trace Project, online at notrace.how/threat-library/
“Threat Modeling Fundamentals” by Håkan Geijer on Riot Medicine, online at opsec.riotmedicine.net
more on infiltration
Fuck the (Hamilton) Police, online at fuckhps.noblogs.org
“Infiltrated! How to prevent political police from undermining grassroots solidarity” (May 1, 2017) in Briarpatch Magazine, online at briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/infiltrated
“Living among us: Activists speak out on police infiltration” (July 1, 2011) by Tim Groves, online at briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/living-among-us
“Stop Hunting Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks” (2011) on Sprout Distro, online at sproutdistro.com/catalog/zines/security/stop-hunting-sheep/
“The G20 Main Conspiracy Group: The Charges and How They Came to Be” (2012) on the No Trace Project, online at notrace.how/resources/#toronto-g20-main-conspiracy-group
“Why Misogynists Make Great Informants” (Spring/Summer 2010) by Courtney Desiree Morris on Incite! National, online at incite-national.org/2010/07/15/why-misogynists-make-great-informants-how-gender-violence-on-the-left-enables-state-violence-in-radical-movements/
from Scenes from the Atlanta Forest
“We are not special. Our skills are not overly technical or advanced, and our tools are simple to acquire. If you are reading this, you are capable of doing what we do.”
While I agree with this sentiment, the reader is left with many questions about how to develop such a capacity for action, even if they are motivated. What exactly does it take to not get caught carrying out heavy actions like arson? This is especially important in the long run; not getting caught for a single arson is one thing, but being able to continue carrying out attacks in the face of heightened repressive attention is quite another.
For anyone who wants to carry out actions like this, but isn’t doing so yet, I’ve sketched an outline of the steps I think are necessary to sustain hard-hitting attacks on domination (limited to the topic of “operational” considerations, i.e., acquiring skills). This brief outline is intended to orient you and provide a “learning path” — each step has recommended reading that actually goes into the appropriate amount of depth on the subject. Use the Tails operating system to visit these links, which runs from a USB drive and leaves no trace on your computer. What I’ve written here is by no means definitive, and I hope to spark a dialogue about any operational aspects I may have neglected, as well as anything outside this scope that is important for sustaining and intensifying the capacity for action.
For anyone who doesn’t already have an action group, deciding who to act with is the first obstacle to overcome. I prefer to act in groups of two or three; it’s easier to maintain a high level of trust and agility with just a small handful of people. Most actions don’t require more than three participants, and when they do, action groups can collaborate. I prefer not to act alone because some aspects of actions are less risky when there are at least two people (for example, having a lookout).
In deciding who to act with, there is a tension between flexibility and consistency. Acting in several different configurations allows you to develop trust and experience with more people, which makes you more resilient in the face of arrests, burnout, or interpersonal splits. On the other hand, acting in a more consistent configuration can make it easier to develop a higher capacity for action in a shorter period of time.
Action groups only form because someone takes the initiative to propose them to a comrade with whom they want to deepen affinity and trust.
Deciding who to approach in your network should be based on a sense of affinity between you, as this will determine what the action group decides to focus on. Affinity means sharing analysis, discovered through getting to know each other, that leads to prospects for action. It means knowing that you share goals and want to act in similar ways to pursue them.
The long-term exploration and deepening of affinity across a network, beyond a specific action group, opens up many more possibilities for the configuration of action groups to adapt over time, as well as for collaboration between them. I’ve chosen to use the term “action group” rather than “affinity group” to emphasize that affinity exists in many different constellations, each with its own potential.
Recommended reading:
Trust is contextual — you may trust someone to be a good friend, but that is different from trusting them with your freedom. Deciding who to approach in your network should be based on trust that they can live with the possible consequences of their actions without betraying their comrades, even if it means a long prison sentence. Trust is qualitative in a way that can’t be reduced to a simplistic formula. It’s based on an intimate knowledge that can only come from singular experiences within a relationship. However, there are established practices for deepening trust that are still worthwhile.
Recommended reading:
Once there are two or three people who want to experiment with acting together, I recommend starting with actions that do not have particularly serious consequences if you get caught, such as breaking windows. This allows you to assess whether the configuration is a good fit, practice any skills that are new to anyone, establish operational approaches and a good “workflow” for the tasks involved, and develop an interpersonal dynamic that meets everyone’s needs, all in a relatively low-stakes environment. Progressively increasing the intensity of the action also gives you the opportunity to practice moving through fear so that decision-making, communication, and execution in high-stress situations can remain unimpeded.
“Operational security” means the practices that allow you to get away with crimes. I recommend that your action group first discuss each of the highlighted resources at the No Trace Project before taking action, in an outdoor and device-free location. Many of these discussions are well suited for larger affinity constellations than your action group. This will take a considerable amount of time, but an in-depth discussion of these topics will provide a necessary foundation. Don’t make the mistake of assuming that everyone is already on the same page. These conversations will also be an opportunity to discuss how you will prepare for any repression that may result from your actions.
With this foundation in place, you are now in a strong position to begin action planning. As you gain experience, organizing and executing actions will become much more natural. What was initially a lot to keep track of will eventually become second nature. This is another reason why it’s a good idea to start with actions that aren’t particularly risky.
Recommended reading:
Before your action group engages in actions that will be more intensively investigated, it is especially important that you become competent in two operational security practices:
DNA minimization protocols are necessary to avoid leaving evidence at a crime scene. However, these precautions are not perfect, so the action should be conducted in such a way as to leave nothing behind that could have DNA traces on it. I recommend learning and practicing this skill long before you actually need to use it for high-risk actions.
Recommended reading:
If there is no evidence left at crime scenes, and you have established practices that prevent targeted digital surveillance from providing leads, investigators will be forced to use physical surveillance to try to incriminate you. The main goal of physical surveillance is to surveil the suspect during an action (as they did for Jeff Luers), and if that doesn’t work, to surveil the suspect while they are preparing for an action (buying materials, doing reconnaissance, etc.), all the while mapping the suspect’s network to find more suspects.
Detecting physical surveillance is a skill that takes a lot of practice, so I recommend that you start learning it long before you actually need to use it for high-risk actions. If you are ever the target of an investigation, this is the only thing that will prevent the police from following you to an action or preparation for an action.
Recommended reading:
Of course, skills related to action techniques are also important. For example, there are many ways to start a fire. Some are better than others in terms of reliability and effectiveness, but your approach should always be adapted to the specific scenario (target, exit plan, expected response times, etc.). Whatever techniques you end up using, it’s important to stay open to innovation rather than limiting yourself to following a guide.
Action technique is also related to operational security: for example, if you decide that the incendiary device(s) need a delay, it’s critical to be very confident that the delay won’t fail, as this would leave evidence for investigators to take samples from. Thoroughly test its reliability under the same conditions, and build in redundancy by using multiple delays on each device. Depending on the circumstances and terrain, you may even want to make a plan for noticing if any fires don’t start, such as choosing an exit route that provides a line of sight and pausing along it until you see the light of the flames.
Recommended reading:
The next step in developing capacity for action requires going beyond one’s own group. This is where things get really interesting: coordination between autonomous groups allows them to accomplish far more than they could on their own, while their autonomy wards off hierarchy and centralization. Of course, conspiring with more people involves risk and must be balanced with the need for compartmentalization — the need-to-know principle can help here.
Affinity is the strongest foundation for a common project among these groups — while affinity within an action group is based on interpersonal experience, affinity between action groups is based more on affinity with the project than with each other. The long-term search for affinity beyond your action group is what makes this foundation possible. Informal organization can then grow between action groups, which is a model that has been experimented with since the ’70s. Informal organization is born and shaped by the pursuit of specific goals, such as preventing the construction of Cop City through diffuse sabotage. “It doesn’t have a name to defend or assert, only a project to bring about”.
This outline touches on what I think are the minimal steps necessary to develop a capacity for hard-hitting action, limited to the topic of acquiring skills. Much more is needed — learning other skills beyond this baseline, experimenting with informal organization while navigating its challenges, developing analyses to understand the changing terrain, studying the vulnerabilities of domination, and focusing on all the other aspects that contribute to sustaining and intensifying action.
from Iffy Books
At this workshop we’ll discuss strategies for maintaining privacy when working on activist projects. We’ll focus on ways location data from your phone can be used against you, and how to keep you and your friends safe.
from Instagram
A second antifascist was visited by the FBI in Philadelphia yesterday. Well, sort of. The weird thing is the FBI wasn’t even looking in the right ‘state’ as the person they were seeking out lives in New Jersey. That’s some real Grade A police work! Anyway. The state is up to something – possibly in collaboration with far right conspiracy theories that ‘antifa’ had something to do with the right wing violence on January 6th. News flash: ‘antifa’ had nothing to do with that whole shitshow, that scene was a wholly white supremacist riot. Be safe friends, MAKE SECURITY CULTURE YOUR #1 PRIORITY. They are only trying to intimidate us – don’t let them – be brave!
from Twitter
[This afternoon, January 15 2021, an anti-fascist comrade was visited by two FBI agents at their home in Philadelphia.
The agents said they had questions about the recent events at the Capitol. The comrade refused to answer questions & immediately got in touch with legal & anti-repression support. We don’t rely on the state to address fascist threats. The FBI has roots in repressing anarchist and Black liberation movements. We do not trust that they are only investigating the events at the Capitol. We challenge their attempts at repression with our collective refusal to speak to law enforcement.
If you are contacted by the FBI or other law enforcement, contact Up Against The Law or Philly Anti-Repression.
Up Against The Law: 484-758-0388
Philly Anti-Repression: 267-460-1886]
COMMUNITY ALERT: ALEX STEIN
[CW: SA, misogyny, racism]
(Written content contains brief references to sexual assault, harassment, and predatory behavior.
Images contain examples of misogyny and feature course language; images have been edited for hate-speech and to protect uninvolved individuals.)
It is our hope that this information may serve as a warning to others of the dangers posed by the individual known as Alex Stein; a predator with a history of sexual assault, and a supposed “anarchist” with fascist associations who has repeatedly attempted to organize, infiltrate, and recruit in leftist spaces.
Alex has been known by many names. In the fascist’s circles, where Alex appears to spend much of his time, he may be known as “Brandon Woods” (aka “Brandon W PA”) or “Sam Specter” (aka “Sam Specter PA”). While attempting to purport himself as a “leftist” Alex has operated under numerous aliases, including: “Alex Stone”, “Terry”, “Felix”, “George Bailey”, “Woody”, and “slyalex”.
He is the creator & primary author of the Twitter account “Anticommunist Action Philly” (@AnticomPHL) and the page “WolftrapAF”, which operates on multiple social media platforms under the usernames “WolftrapAF”, and the associated account, “TwolftrapAF”.
Alex is also believed to utilize numerous additional accounts under his various personas -ranging from democratic socialist to insurrectionary anarchist, which may be listed in locations across the country- using multiple social media platforms. Evidence suggests that this is done in order to continue to attempt to cultivate new relationships with leftists; and <b> <i> to avoid accountability for his history of abuse, including multiple accounts of sexual assault and predatory behavior, repeated attempts to incite dangerous and high-risk situations against the consent of others in the area, volunteering information on activists to far-right groups [and the state,] and his wide-spread banishment from spaces.
While living in New York, Alex’s reported history included harassment, abuse, and aggressive behavior which resulted in his expulsion from radical spaces.
After moving to Pennsylvania in late 2016, Alex quickly attempted to insert himself into activist spaces, almost immediately acting with a complete disregard for the safety of others.
In late 2016 Alex began using his social media accounts to repeatedly make public posts calling for people to engage in “antifascist” organizing, tagging unaware individuals across the country, and encouraging others to form local organizations operating under his personal guidance.
Over the holiday season he launched an online fundraiser for an action in Montana using his legal name, along with the name of a legitimate local activist group. As an individual publicly raising money for an antifascist cause he was almost immediately doxed. The funds, which were intended to support local activists on the ground, were never accounted for and numerous reports suggest they were stolen. During this time he participated in media interviews, purporting himself as a ‘representative’ of various local groups and organizations as it suited his cause and as he perceived it would be of interest to each particular news agency.
In early 2017, Alex began to attempt to force his way into radical spaces claiming to offer expertise gained through membership in groups he was never a part of, and taking over control of tasks and events being organized by others against their wishes. Playing off his youthful appearance and lying about his age, he targeted spaces occupied by younger activists and consistently attempted to push others to engage in actions they did not consent to participate in. He employed these forced associations, along with the city-wide success of a MAGA counter-demonstration in the spring of 2017, to further establish his credibility within local activist circles. Over the following months, Alex used this notoriety to commit multiple acts of sexual assault. Using his position in the local community and his strong manipulation skills, he quickly created an environment of fear to silence his victims through threats of danger to themselves and of ostracization from their community.
From March through June of 2017 Alex’s intermittent presence and consistently toxic behavior in various local spaces persisted, as did the demands for him to be accountable for his actions. To avoid expulsion from the community he continuously ‘took accountability’ for smaller indiscretions and offensive behavior- making superficial motions towards responsibility while insisting that his inexperience, heavy alcohol use, and lack of understanding of social cues relieved him of any ‘guilt’. Instead, he repeatedly created ‘roles’ for himself in order to force his way back into spaces, while he continued to intimidate his victims and engage in abusive and predatory behavior. During this time he befriended an individual working at a local crisis center who cited their experience as a victims’ advocate to justify their championing of Alex’s continued presence.
In June an individual confided to fellow community members about a specific instance of Alex’s predatory behavior which had left them feeling extremely unsafe and requested support to eliminate any possible future situations where he may be able to approach them while alone. The public recognition of the need for this safety measure created a space for additional victims of his abuse to come forward. Following an extensive review of all presented accounts of experiences Alex was held accountable by the community for r*ping a local activist along with a series of additional instances of predatory behavior, expelled from the space, and banished from all future events. Warning calls were immediately made to contacts and other local groups Alex had been known to engage with to urge that steps be taken to ensure the safety of community members in any spaces where he may be present. Hours after Alex was informed of his expulsion from the local community a large-scale public campaign of extreme harassment began against an individual acting as an advocate for his victims, and their family, which placed them in personal and legal jeopardy. This resulted in some local groups hesitating to formally ban Alex from their events out of fear of similar retaliation against themselves and their loved ones.
In July it became publicly known that Alex had begun associating with local fascists, as well as with the white nationalist group, Vanguard America, while they engaged in the planning process for “Unite the Right” in Charlottesville, Virginia. During this period Alex attempted to contact numerous groups and organizations in an effort to build connections and networks by exploiting the promise of information regarding these plans, which was needed to ensure the safety of the local community, in order to create relationships of dependency with activists from around the country.
For the next month Alex leveraged these awaited critical details, and his unique ability to provide them, to avoid further censure for his actions as the word of his history of abuse and the resulting calls for him to be banned from additional communal spaces spread widely. Having failed to ever provide the information as promised, Alex actively participated in the events of “Unite the Right” all the while continuing to subject activists on the ground to rapidly escalating levels of danger in an attempt to maintain the indispensable role he had created for himself with activists and organizers.
Shortly after “Unite the Right”, Alex was arrested in the company of local fascists following a[n alleged] ‘fight’ and charged with possession of a retractable baton. Afterwards, he told local activists that he had been released from custody after [reportedly] telling police that despite appearances, he was in fact “an antifascist infiltrator”, and had information he wished to share regarding the nationalist group, Vanguard America. Following subsequent court dates he once again attempted to enter local spaces, despite repeatedly being told that he was unwelcome due to his history of abusive and predatory behavior.
With his abusive and predatory history now widely known, Alex found himself barred from more and more spaces upon his return to the Philadelphia area. In late August he attempted to contact members of the local community once again, claiming to have been ejected from the group Vanguard America where he had participated in chats under the alias “Brandon Woods” aka “Brandon W PA”, accusing respected local activists of “outing him” to Vanguard America leadership and demanding they be banned from future local events, in an attempt to once again force his way into the community.
Upon finding himself still unwelcome, and his claims quickly and easily disproven, Alex sought to once again create a role for himself and engineer relationships by reaching out and offering information to activists around the country who had not yet learned of his history of assault. Promising that his help would better ensure the continued safety of their local communities, this time he purported to offer information regarding the actions of the newly-formed white nationalist group, Patriot Front, which he had gained entry to through his new alias, “Sam Specter” [aka “Sam Specter PA”].
Throughout the fall Alex strived to find a place for himself in small regional circles, attempting to exploit their decreased access to the larger community and its resources. When he was instead confronted with knowledge of his past actions he offered elaborate falsified accounts of events and circumstances, customizing the details to suit each audience.
When efforts to hold him accountable continued and he was denied acceptance into spaces he attempted to garner sympathy for his exclusion, and when that failed, he resorted to threats, intimidation, and sexually-predatory behavior. -Once again, individuals were forced to go to great lengths in attempts to block his access to their spaces and warn their communities of his danger in an effort to maintain their own personal safety.
In Winter of 2018, it came to light that Alex had been in ongoing contact with an individual who was engaged in gathering personal information on individuals whom they considered to be ‘activists’. This information was later published and used for targeted harassment campaigns against those identified. Additional reports suggested that while Alex had been engaging in outreach to individuals to offer information and build relationships, he may have also used the opportunity to request additional details and contact information during these conversations. The exact purpose of these inquiries, and whom, if anyone, that information may have been shared with, cannot be conclusively confirmed. The majority of these [known] attempts were quickly shut down and rumors began circulating that he had begun spending a significant portion of his time in New Jersey despite retaining his official residence in Philadelphia.
Despite claims in Spring of 2018 of leaving the left in May, Alex once again began reaching out to leftist spaces. After claiming to have participated in May Day actions in NYC, he also attempted to reach out to radical organizations in the Philadelphia area in June, though these efforts were quickly rejected. Recently, it was reported that Alex had begun attempting to build new relationships and connections in an effort to create a role for himself in the response to Unite The Right II events to be held in D.C. this year.
This information is an open warning call; this individual poses a danger to all communities. Due to nature of his tactics, his extraordinary manipulation skills, his enjoyment of “playing a character”, and his use of multiple aliases both in real life and online, protective steps should be implemented across all spaces and platforms. In addition to ‘activist’ spaces, Alex frequents burlesque, film, theater/performance spaces, and sideshow spaces. He particularly enjoys “haunted attractions” and may seek employment in these venues. He appears to spend most of his time in the Northeast and is most frequently in the Philadelphia, South Jersey, and New York City regions.
Over at least the last year, Alex focused the majority of his recruiting energy on engaging with those he perceived as liberal. In doing so he attempts to offer guidance and create dependence on his involvement to access additional resources and educational opportunities. This also allows him to control not only his own narrative, but to ensure new contacts remain isolated from the larger community where they may learn of his history. In reality, Alex uses his new friends not only for access to new spaces and for the creation of networks under his control, but also for his personal entertainment.
Please help to ensure others in your area are alerted to this risk by sharing this information in local activist and performance spaces as able. If Alex has attempted to organize or is involved in burlesque or other community spaces in your area, to report additional accounts/aliases, or for a shareable flyer version of this alert, please contact KeepOurSpacesSafe@protonmail.com. Thank you.
from Facebook
[Continua en Español]
Do you feel surveilled by the oppressive systems as a womyn and gender non-conforming POC? Do you feel harassed in the public {{{and private}}} digital space called THE internet? Do you want to use the tools and not be used by corporations? Do you want to ENJOY a transfeminist Internet?! Come and join us in this laboratory to stretch your hackfeminist muscles!
Register here:
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/multi-cyberfeminist-identities-a-self-defense-strategy-for-warrior-womyn-tickets-46915156496
Our body is our first technology as a womyn warriors. How can we defend us and care for collectively?
A lab session to explore how to fight with joy the different threats and counter-attack war technologies: espionage, facial recognition, and mass surveillance when we inhabit the internet. How internet affects our communications, our privacy, and our public opinions? We invite you to define this digital territory as our ground battle where we are in defense of our digital bodies, pleasures, struggles, and politics! We will experiment how can we transmute into multiple cyber identities, and how the use of our right to be anonymous can be a powerful kick-ass tool of hackeminist self-defense. (; We welcome all LBTQ and womyn! No previous experience need it, so come and just bring yourself!
This session is co-facilitated by Lil_Anaz, Mexican hackfeminist artist based in México City, and Ana Martina, Mexican hackfeminist cooperator based in Philly, who join forces to share strategies towards the liberation of the multiple territories that we inhabit: our bodies, our neighborhoods, our data and our Internet! Join us for this unique event!
We ask a $5 -$25 sliding scale donation to support the presenter Lil_Anaz who is coming from México to present this content in Philly! Nobody will be turned away!
Co-facilitated by @Lil_Anaz https://lab-interconectividades.net/lili_anaz/, https://twitter.com/lili_anaz
& @radiosonidera https://radicante.media/about
[Español]
Registrate aqui
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/multi-cyberfeminist-identities-a-self-defense-strategy-for-warrior-womyn-tickets-46915156496
¿Te sientes vigiladx por este sistema opresivo por ser mujer o de género no binario y persona de color? ¿Te sientes acosadx en el espacio público y {{{privado}}} de Internet? ¿Quieres aprender a usar herramientas tecnológicas y no ser utilizadx por las corporaciones? ¿Quieres GOZAR una Internet transfeminista? ¡Pues ven y acompáñanos en este laboratorio para calentar esos músculos hackfeministas! No necesitas tener ninguna experiencia previa.
Nuestro cuerpo es nuestra primera tecnología como mujeres guerreras. ¿Cómo podemos defendernos y cuidarnos colectivamente?
En esta sesión exploraremos cómo combatir los diferentes peligros cuando habitamos Internet, y cómo contra-atacar a las tecnologías de guerra (espionaje, reconocimiento facial y vigilancia masiva) con tecnologías de gozo cyberfeminista. ¿Cómo afecta Internet anuestras comunicaciones, nuestra privacidad y nuestras opiniones públicas? Lxs invitamos a reimaginar este territorio también como nuestro campo de batalla en el que defendemos nuestros cuerpos, nuestros placeres y nuestras luchas! Vamos a transmutar en multi cyber-identidades y experimentar cómo el derecho al anonimato puede ser una poderosa y chingona herramienta para la auto defensa hackfeminista. Todxs lxs mujeres LBTQ son bienvenidxs a este laboratorio. ¡No necesitas tener ninguna experiencia previa! (;
Esta sesión sera co-facilitada por Lil_Anaz, artista mexicana hackfeminista que reside en la Ciudad de México, y Ana Martina cooperativista hackfeminista que reside en Philly. Estamos uniendo fuerzas para compartir estrategias para la liberación de los múltiples territorios que habitamos: nuestros cuerpos, nuestros barrios, nuestros datos y nuestro Internet. Acompañanos en este evento único!
Pedimos una cooperación de $5 a $25 para apoyar con gastos y viaticos a la presentadora Lil_Anaz, a quién esta viniendo desde México para presentar estos contenidos en Philly. Si no puedes cooperar no te preocupes, a nadie se le negara la entrada.
Co-facilitado por @Lil_Anaz https://lab-interconectividades.net/lili_anaz/, https://twitter.com/lili_anaz
& @radiosonidera https://radicante.media/about
Submission
These photos were taken by me, friends, or stolen from the internet. They are of graffiti, stickers, and window smashings around town. To my knowledge none of these acts were claimed with communiques. I do not know the intentions of whoever carried them out but they lift my mood, and bring some joy to my day. I share them here to remind myself and anyone reading what is possible, to generate inspiration, and to help spread the disorder of the city to those who might not have the good fortune to stroll by it as they go about their day.
The broken windows are at Swirl Cafe in West Philly (attacked twice!) and OCF Realty in South Philly.
All these photos are from the last few months. Each photo (with the exception of those taken from the internet) have been cropped and all of them had their metadata removed to avoid identifying the cameras they were taken with.
from Facebook
PLEASE SHARE, INFILTRATOR ALERT
Back in June 2017, Camp White Pine experienced an uptick in attempted infiltration. SOME entity sent no less than three infiltrators to the Huntingdon area who used various tactics to try to scheme their way into the movement.
One of them called herself “Aly Patrick.” She made contact with a local person who had been prominently in support of the Gerharts’ efforts to #StopETP since last year while that local was working in a public place. She befriended them, claiming she had moved to the area because of the lake, and because her online job allowed her freedoms. She asked a lot of questions, but couldn’t even answer the question of who her specific “online” employer was. She came to public rallies and was incredibly enthusiastic. However, she strategically avoided cameras at those events.
“Aly” claimed not to use any social media platforms. We found a picture of her anyway, taken at one of the rallies she attended. She was last seen driving a white sedan with Virgina plates and gave a phone number with a Tennessee area code. Please share with your networks, and help make sure “Aly” never succeeds in infiltrating any water protector movements.
For more insight into dirty disruption tactics read the section “Social Engagement Plan” of this article from The Intercept: https://theintercept.com/…/leaked-documents-reveal-securit…/
And this follow-up article under the section “Use as many locals as we can”: https://theintercept.com/…/dapl-security-firm-tigerswan-re…/
from Philly Antifa
A fake twitter account has gone up posing as our organization. This is becoming a common tactic by Fascists trying to disrupt Antifa organizing.
Here is a link to our real twitter account (@phillyantifa). Spread the word about the fake and be vigilant for further attempts.
from Facebook
Computer literacy & defense
“skillshare with demonstrations
beginner subjects included but not limited to: feeling comfortable with your OS (operating system), understanding the way your computer fits together, RAM vs. ROM, computer maintenance & hygiene, password strength.
intermediate subjects we can introduce and demonstrate if people are interested: VPN (Virtual Private Network), PGP-encrypted email, introduction to the math that crypto is made of, the limitations of Signal & Riseup.
bring a laptop if you have one.
RESOURCES:
https://riseup.net/en/security
disclaimer: not an expert, just a geek. open to breakout groups and open to co-facilitating w another geek.”
[March 19th 4 to 7PM at Wooden Shoe Books 704 South St]
from Facebook
Digital Self Defense Series are back! This time to explore tools for Browsing. A Lab to explore TOR, Bitmask and exploration on VPN’s. Come with ur devices, questions and experience to try these tools together. All levels of experience welcome, we encourage the learning together experience. This is a free event, hosted by Radicante.Media. Bring snacks if u wish! /// Las Series de Auto Defena Digital estan de regreso!!! Esta vez para explorar herramientas de Navegacion. Un Laboratorio abierto para explorar TOR, Bitmask y VPN’s. Caele con tu dispositivo, preguntas y experiencia para probar estas herramientas juntxs. Todos los niveles de experiencia son bienvenidos, esta es una sesion para compartir conocimiento juntxs. Este es un evento liberado gratuito a cargo de Radicante.Media. Traete una botana o algo pa compartir si quieres!!!
[December 10 from 2PM to 4PM at 1652 Ridge Avenue in the Francisville neighborhood (part of North Philadelphia)]
